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BOOK REVIEW
Models as Make-Believe: Imagination, 
Fiction and Scienti!c Representation
ADAM TOON
Palgrave. 2012.
What do the following social practices have in com-
mon: children playing with dolls houses or Lego 
bricks and scientists building and using models to 
examine how the world works? More than one might 
think, according to a fascinating new book by Adam 
Toon. Scientists spend a lot of time building, using 
and revising models of di+erent parts of the world, 
from subatomic particles to the solar system, world 
history or the international system (if you count 
social scientists such as this reviewer). So what mod-
els are, and how they represent the world, is in many 
ways an important question. Adam Toon in Models as 
Make-Believe o+ers a lucid and stimulating argument 
that deserves to be read widely, inside as well as out-
side philosophy. Although he concentrates on mod-
els in the natural sciences, his argument potentially 
pertains to knowledge production aimed at global 
challenges such as climate change and managing the 
world economy, where modelling is central. The fol-
lowing presents this reviewers’ understanding of the 
key argument and suggests some implications for how 
we should view and treat models.
How do scienti!c models represent the world? The 
book critiques the ‘indirect view’ according to which 
models !rst construct a !ctional ‘model-system’ 
where idealized or simpli!ed conditions exist (planets 
as perfect spheres, friction free movement, perfectly 
rational states, etc.). In a second iteration scientists 
compare such model-systems to the parts of reality 
that they supposedly depict or otherwise represent.
Toon argues that this indirect view of the work that 
models do has a number of problems. One is that it is 
unclear what status these model-systems have. How 
come we can know things about models, discuss them 
and think about them, even say true or false things 
about them, without them really existing? To a real-
ist, making meaningful statements about something 
requires there to be a ‘something’ and so the entities 
that statements in a model refer to must exist in some 
sense, e.g. like !ctional characters in novels. The ques-
tion then remains, however, what such !ctional enti-
ties are. Anti-realists avoid this problem, because they 
argue that !ctional-realists do not need to exist in any 
sense outside the statement about them. But this makes 
it di,cult to claim that the model-system (which does 
not exist) matches or otherwise resembles another 
object and opposite statements about them would 
potentially be equally valid (saying the !ctional char-
acter ‘Dracula is a vampire’ would be equally as true 
as ‘Dracula is a vegetarian’). So either way the indirect 
view relies on something it cannot account for.
A second problem of the indirect view relates to 
the second stage where the model-system is said to 
represent an object. Sometimes models ‘represent’ 
things that do not exist. This could be models of 
things that turn out not to exist such as the ether, but 
also more mundanely applies to a model of a bridge 
that never gets built, or an experiment that ends up 
not having funding and so never sees the light of day. 
In fact, models routinely and deliberately involve mis-
representation. In such cases, what does a model then 
represent? And if it doesn’t represent anything, how 
can it then still be a model (if models by de!nition 
represent things)? Toon argues that models still rep-
resent, even when the object is missing. Modelling as 
a practice is not dependent upon there being a target, 
but the indirect view of models seems to require this.
The ‘models as make-believe’ view, Toon argues, 
can help us with both problems. It suggests that mod-
els are ‘props’ that make an audience imagine things 
directly about the world: ‘They prescribe a web of 
 The British Journal of Aesthetics Advance Access published August 5, 2014
 at University of Cambridge on September 12, 2014
http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from 
2 | BOOK REVIEW
imaginings which the scientist can then go on to 
explore’ (75). In doing this, we are asked to reject 
the idea that models are ‘!ctions’ simply because 
they are inaccurate or claimed not to be true. Rather, 
Toon adapts Kendall Walton’s theory of art and its 
rather speci!c idea of !ction. For Walton, !ctionality 
depends on something being used as a prop in a game 
of make-believe. Props plus ‘principles of generation’ 
prescribe us to imagine things about the world. This 
view of ‘!ction’ makes sense because it is not synony-
mous with truth or falsehood. Books we !nd on the 
‘non-!ction’ shelf may be credible or non-credible 
and we choose whether to believe them or not, but in 
both cases they are non-!ction. In contrast, the spe-
cial thing about ‘!ction’ in Walton’s sense is that the 
reader is required to imagine the things that a novel, a 
picture—or a model—asks us to imagine. The reader 
of a !ctional novel, or a child doing role play, plays a 
game of make-believe. Similarly, ‘scientists using the 
model understand that they are to imagine everything 
that the model says, simply because it says it’ (75).
This direct view supposedly removes the problem of 
what the ‘model-system’ is because it does away with 
the intermediary model-system altogether. Instead 
models prompt us to have imaginings about the world 
directly. It also avoids the problem of how models can 
be models despite ‘missing objects’. A model may rep-
resent something that does not really exist, because 
models are !ctional only in the sense that we enter 
into a game of make-believe that requires of us that we 
imagine what they describe. Equally something could 
also be !ctional (in this Waltonian sense) even while 
what it represents is true, just as the novel ‘War and 
Peace’ prescribes that we imagine Napoleon invading 
Russia in 1812 (which he did) (40). What makes it !c-
tional is that it prescribes imaginings about the world 
that we are to go along with. Scienti!c models work in 
the same way, Toon suggests.
Apart from tackling these philosophical problems, 
Toon argues persuasively that this direct view is in 
many ways a more accurate way of accounting for 
what actually goes on when scientists construct and 
use models. Chapter 5, ‘Playing with Molecules’, pres-
ents a thought-provoking analysis of social interaction 
between a scientist and some non-scientists who were 
!lmed while being asked to ‘reason out loud’ as they 
made sense of a physical model of a molecule. Toon 
claims to show the participants talk as if they are dis-
cussing the molecule itself (rather than a model of it), 
and ‘speak as if they can see the molecule’ (113), han-
dling it as if they were manipulating the molecule itself.
To this social scientist the postulated similarities 
between make-believe games and the use of scienti!c 
models seem quite convincing. In international rela-
tions, game theorists set up models, e.g. with two per-
fectly rational states playing ‘chicken’ or in prisoners’ 
dilemmas and speak about make-believe countries: 
‘Country A defects’ or ‘Country B cooperates.’ They 
draw pictures of the structure of anarchy in the interna-
tional system and even say a theory is a ‘picture, men-
tally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. 
A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain 
and the connections among its parts’.1 Social scien-
ti!c models are usually prepared descriptions, images 
or computer-generated models rather than physical 
objects. But as long as they function as props for imagin-
ings, they will all be models, according to this account.
‘So what?’, the reader may ask. The implications 
of the make-believe view might have been spelled out 
more clearly, although to be fair, this takes us beyond 
the remit of the book. Still, some implications are 
hinted at (and others I infer).
Firstly, if a model is a prop to imagine things about 
the world, this changes the status of imagination in 
scienti!c work. Imagination, in this case, is not a friv-
olous human weakness but an indispensable scienti!c 
tool. Rationalist modelling is therefore perhaps less 
rationalistic than its proponents have claimed. Citing 
the historian Alan Rocke, Toon argues that early 
‘chemists’ ability to imagine the unseen microworld 
of atoms was a “pillar” of their methodology’ (107). 
International relations scholars’ ability to imagine 
the unobservable world of structure in the interna-
tional system would also be an indispensable tool for 
learning about the world. Rather than just being a 
1 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1979), 8.
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simplifying device, models are generative. We argu-
ably commit ourselves much more wholeheartedly to 
models than if they were similar to !ctional charac-
ters, and therefore perhaps we ought to be more wary 
of the powers we allow them to have over us.
Secondly, Toon’s account appears to imply that the 
practice of scienti!c modelling should not be under-
stood as an individualistic form of practice. According 
to Walton’s theory of art, !ction is ‘public’ in the sense 
that it does not depend on what is imagined subjec-
tively, but on what the generative rules prescribe we 
should imagine. Toon takes the example of children 
playing a game where tree stumps in a forest ‘are’ 
bears. He points out that even if one of the children 
thinks that one stump actually resembles a wolf, the 
game still makes it !ctional that it is a bear. This might 
suggest that modelling is a special case of a more gen-
eral kind of practice in which meanings and rules for 
interpretation and action are created and negotiated 
socially. Can modelling be considered a kind of per-
formative ‘speech act’? Toon notes that the water run-
ning through a Phillips model (representing the in.ows 
and out.ows of a generic national economy) is di+erent 
from the water running through the pipes in his .at, 
even though neither represents a particular instance of 
something (e.g. a speci!c national economy). The dif-
ference is that in the Phillips model a game of make-
believe is being enacted even while there is no speci!c 
object being represented. This also implies that mod-
elling, like speech acts, requires validation from an 
audience—something the book does not spell out (or 
refute). If the individual child is reminded of a wolf 
when it sees a tree stump, this is not an act of represen-
tation, unless she suggests it as a new rule and the other 
children accept it as now being a wolf. How scienti!c 
models actually function therefore depends on an audi-
ence ‘playing the game’ and scienti!c modelling must 
therefore be seen as a thoroughly social activity.
Finally, what models are made of (physical objects, 
pictures, concepts, etc.) appears to make a di+erence 
to how they work. Simple stipulation that a model 
should be taken to represent something is not enough. 
To ‘model-represent’, Toon argues, requires some 
form of depiction in the sense that models have to help 
us imagine what it is they represent. How they model-
represent something matters. As Toon explains, in 
the game of bears in the woods, the props (the tree 
stumps) themselves represent something (bears) and 
the children imagine they are looking at bears. The 
tree stumps perform a ‘re.exive’ model function. In 
contrast, in the novel War and Peace the ink on the page 
is not imagined to be Napoleon or Russia, even though 
the words are props that facilitate imaginings about 
Napoleon and Russia. To view a picture of Napoleon, 
on the other hand, involves the observer also imagin-
ing he or she is actually looking at Napoleon. For the 
models as make-believe approach, pictures and models 
therefore matter in themselves. Diagrams and objects 
are the model, not a representation of the model.
Despite this, and the delightfully clear argumen-
tation throughout, a couple of questions internal 
to the argument of the book remained unclear to 
this reviewer. We are told that the status of !ctional 
model-systems is problematic in the indirect view, 
but there is apparently no problem accounting for 
the status of the ‘imaginings’ that the make-believe 
view points to. Is this perhaps because in the direct 
view we can get away with an anti-realist position 
that says they do not need to exist, since nothing is 
subsequently compared to reality (we imagine real-
ity directly)? Yet Toon seems to suggest that imagin-
ings about the world are ultimately to be compared 
to target systems: ‘Simply put, a model is accurate 
in a certain respect if and only if what it prescribes 
us to imagine in that respect is true of the object it 
represents’ (67). This raises the question of whether 
Toon’s may also be an indirect view of sorts. It could 
of course be argued that evaluating models is not part 
of the modelling process. But the aim throughout 
the book is to understand how models are actually 
used to produce and evaluate knowledge. Is the direct 
view then in fact also an incomplete view of scienti!c 
modelling?
Olaf Corry
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